This is from The Intersection column that appears every other Monday in Mint. If the United States had not coerced India to restrict its relationship with Iran in 2018, we would likely have bilateral annual trade of over $20 billion (importing 650,000 barrels a day of crude oil) and building strategic connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia through the Chahbahar port. Nothing in the bilateral relationship was responsible for our loss. India was forced to reduce its purchases of oil and its own goods exports by Washington’s sanctions and quotas.  Now that the US-Israeli war on Iran has created a new situation in West Asia, India must take the initiative to quickly rebuild ties with Tehran. Whatever positions New Delhi took before and during the war, realism demands that it deal with the consequences as they have unfolded. The Iranians have given us an opening by extending India an invitation to the state funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei. New Delhi should respond by sending a high-level representative — the vice-president will be a good choice –, along with a humanitarian package of essential medical supplies and pharmaceuticals for the Iranian people. This must be done without delay.  The changed geopolitical circumstances demand that New Delhi reprioritise its interests in West Asia. For nearly two decades, India has deprecated its relations with Iran as it sought to build strong partnerships with the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This approach yielded rich dividends, as the ties with Washington flowered after the nuclear deal. The Modi government transformed relations with the Abu Dhabi and Riyadh even as it an extensive relationship with Tel Aviv. But these gains came at a cost: the combined weight of India’s West Asian partnerships discouraged closer ties with Tehran. The Iranians, for their own reasons, did little to compete with their neighbours to court New Delhi. Washington’s demand that New Delhi stop buying Iranian crude was just the final blow.  Yet there have always been strong geopolitical reasons for India and Iran to draw closer together. The Kautilyan calculus literally suggests Iran — if it has strategic autonomy — can be an ally. Persian, Shia Iran has never been comfortable with its Arab, Sunni neighbours. As much as Pakistan tries to pursue its own interests, Tehran has well-founded suspicions that Islamabad will follow the Saudi line. These would have been strengthened after Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defence agreement. Religious ideology and political rhetoric might confound the audience, but some of hard-nosed strategists in Tehran see India as a potential ally, and their counterparts in India return the favour.  In the mid-2000s, when Gen Pervez Musharraf was taking the United States for a ride in Afghanistan, I had argued that it is in India’s interests to start a diplomatic initiative to try and bring Washington and Tehran together. India was among the few countries that had both good relations with the two, but would benefit from their rapprochement. But I was told that New Delhi did not have an appetite to even attempt such a venture. India’s interests lay with the Gulf Arab monarchies who did not want Iran to get any stronger. It was also pointed out that powerful Israeli interests in Washington would not allow such a thing to happen, so there was no point in even trying. To be fair, New Delhi was working hard on the US-India relationship at the time and might have calculated that there is no point in letting the Iran angle further complicate an already complicated situation.  That is history. As fantastic as it might appear today, it is in India’s interests for the divide between Washington and Tehran to be bridged. We must not lose sight of this. The political winds might not be favourable today but things can change. Vietnam became an American partner in just over two decades after the two countries fought a long, bloody war. More importantly, India’s strategic establishment must realise that initiative makes a difference.  For now, the immediate task is to start a new phase in India-Iran relations. The Islamic Republic might have survived the war against two vastly superior adversaries, but still faces the task of rebuilding damaged infrastructure and refloating its economy. Also it is by no means certain that its domestic political upheavals are over. So, despite its disappointment with some of New Delhi’s recent actions, Tehran is likely to be receptive to an outreach by India. President Pezeshkian’s invitation should be interpretated as such. A low-profile initiative to provide humanitarian and medical supplies should be followed up with attempts to get direct bilateral trade back on track. India will benefit from a rapid resumption in Iranian crude oil and bitumen imports. Similarly, Iranians will welcome Indian tea, rice, wheat and pharmaceutical exports. New Delhi should offer a line of credit for Iran to import such goods from India. Beyond this, New Delhi could make it easier for Iranians to seek medical treatment in India.  New Delhi should move now — before the 60 day period of the MoU runs out — because it is risky. It is the risk that is the signal. There are many more The Intersection columns here